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European international relations are in transition. The diplomatic permafrost 
of the Cold War is giving way to a search for adjustment through the institution 
of multilateral East-West Conferences. References to the Congresses of Vienna 
(1815) and Berlin (1878) abound in an atmosphere of guarded optimism. Yet 
allusions to the homeostatic European statě systém of the 19th Century are mis-
leading, for the diplomatic style characteristic of a balance of power, whether 
during the Warring States period of ancient China or the Italian Renaissance, 
presupposes inter alia a Community of belief encompassing the major decision-
making elites. Fundamental to the functioning of a self-equilibrating international 
systém is the institutionalization of values in the form of supranational norms 
and, whenever possible, organizations. The acceptance of these norms by parti-
cipating governments is essential if the hopes surrounding multilateral Conference 
diplomacy are to be fulfilled. Conversely, failure to agree on specific rules of 
behavior, e. g., rebus sie stantibus as a fundament of treaty law, bodes ill for 
the successful outcome of a universal diplomatic effort. 
Within the regional subsystém of East Central Europe international legal 
questions are of major importance, for those issues affecting the vital interests 
of the states in this area have since 1945 more often than not been couched in 
the language of legal rhetoric. The reliance on juridical reasoning to resolve 
disputes has the advantage of Controlling the diplomatic dialogue between con-
tending governments in the sense that this communication takes place through 
the manipulation of legal symbols. The restraints of legal terminology do miti-
gate the fervor of nationalistic passion at the Conference table, yet they also 
emphasize absolute values and thereby make agreement on the basis of a poli-
tical compromise improbable. The primaey of the legal orientation struetures the 
negotiations in terms of the rational application of juridical principles which, in 
turn, limits the bargaining capability of the negotiators. International law can 
be a two-edged sword, for while its application in crisis situations may ratio-
nalize the Solution of the conflict in terms of universally aeeepted Standards, a 
strictly legal approach can make a Solution on a pragmatic basis improbable. In 
contemporary world politics few problems illustrate this proposition as clearly 
as the Sudeten German question. 
The fundamental issues of the Sudeten German question as they have deve-
loped through West German and Czechoslovak efforts beginning with a trade 
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agreement in 1967 to achieve a reconciliation are twofold: the challenges to the 
validity of the Anglo-French-German-Italian Munich Agreement and to the 
legality of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from their Bohemian and 
Moravian homeland in 1945—6. Prominent in the background of both questions 
is the possibility of reparations claims and counterclaims which could be ad-
vanced by the governments involved. For both the Czech and German publics 
the financial undertone of these problems lacks the high level of salience intrinsic 
to their symbolic content. An agreed perspective on the past is indispensable to 
a viable understanding between Czechs and Germans, and both Prague and Bonn 
appear convinced that legal reasoning alone provides the most feasible means of 
reaching a mutually palatable historical consensus on which to build a political 
relationship for the 'seventies. 
The Munich Agreement 
Writing in 1942, the Czech Jurist and historian Edvard Táborský presented 
four arguments for the invalidity ab initio of the quadripartite Munich Agree­
ment (September 29, 1938) to bring about the transfer to Germany of Czecho-
slovakia's predominantly German areas — the Sudetenland. Assuredly, Táborský 
wrote from the perspective of the first Czechoslovak Republic (ČSR), but with 
minor modifications the legal scholars of today's Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
(ČSSR) continue to rely on the same brief advanced by their conservative repu-
blican compatriot although their citations pointedly omit any mention of his 
name. The basic points in the Táborský argumentation are: 
1) According to the Constitution of 1920, the President of the Republic, 
Edvard Beneš, lacked the legal competence to authorize a cessión of State terri­
tory in that he failed to secure the approval of Parliament for this act; 
2) The Munich Agreement was cohcluded under duress, i. e., Prague was 
oppressed by a belief in the imminence of a German invasion, and accordingly 
the terms of the treaty are not binding; 
3) The Anglo-French pledge to guarantee the territory of the ČSR in its new 
frontiers constituted an integral part of the Agreement, and the failure to uphold 
this commitment nullified the Obligation of the Czechoslovak government to 
accept the territorial transfer; and 
4) Finally the German military occupation of Bohemia and Moravia on March 
15, 1939 as well as the simultaneous creation of a secessionist Slovák State occas-
ioned the dismemberment of the ČSR and thereby repudiated the spirit and the 
letter of the Agreement1. 
Each of the preceding assertions would in itself be sufficient to invalidate the 
Munich Agreement ab initio; taken together they represent a seemingly convinc-
T á b o r s k ý , Edvard: ,Munich', the Vienna Arbitration and International Law. In: 
Václav B e n e š , Alfred D r u c k e r , and Edvard T á b o r s k ý (editors): Czecho­
slovak Yearbook of International Law. London 1942, pp. 25—37. 
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ing čase for denying legitimacy to the Great Power Solution of a grievous 
minority problém through the modification of a frontier. Yet within the scope 
of international law several interpretations of an event are usually possible, and 
the jurisprudential dispute over the initial validity of the Munich Agreement is 
not an exception to this premise. 
The most complex challenge to the legality of the Agreement is that stemming 
from the alleged lack of competence on the part of the President of the Republic 
to accept and implement in his executive capacity the multilateral proposal to 
cedě the Sudetenland to Germany. Article 64 of the Constitution did require the 
consultation and support of Parliament for treaties altering the territorial base 
of the statě. President Beneš did secure the unanimous consent of the cabinet 
and of the leaders of the major parliamentary political parties for his accedence 
to the Agreement. Táborský and contemporary critics of this diplomatic act 
argue that the constitutional requirement could only have been met by the 
passing of a formal parliamentary resolution in support of the Governmenťs 
policy. The implications of this presumed lack of competence are hardly com-
plimentary to the historical image of President Beneš, who was one of the 
founders of the Republic. It is difficult to accept the notion that the Chief of 
State violated his oath of office by acceding to he Munich Agreement without 
fulfilling his constitutional obligations. Hubert Ripka, a key member of the hrad 
or „fortress" as the Presidenťs dosest circle of advisers was known, described in 
his memoirs the governmental decision-making process during this crisis, and 
his discussion reflects no doubt as to the constitutionality of the Presidenťs 
action 2. Informed Czech opinion on the subject of constitutional interpretation 
remains divided. However, it is notable that in the seven weeks which elapsed 
between the negotiations in Munich and the signing of the final Czechoslovak-
German accord delimiting the new frontier (November 20, 1938), President 
Benes's legal competence was not called into question either by any of the 
signatories of the Agreement or by the Assembly of the League of Nations, 
which lauded the peacemaking efforts of the Powers. 
In an appeal to the theory of generál principles of law as a basis for the 
contention that a transfer of statě territory without parliamentary approval is 
invalid Táborský turned to an analysis of modern constitutions. He recognized 
that executive authority is sufficient to conclude multifarious international 
agreements in most states, yet he asserted that the constitutions of civilized regi-
mes require legislative approval for the cession of national territory. Were this 
argumentation sound, each party to a treaty altering borders would be compelled 
to investigate the constitutional procedures of the other signatory and to confirm 
their observance. Diplomatically such a practice would soon prove to be destruct-
ive of all but the most routine international negotiations. Instead the balance 
of opinion among international lawyérs supports a theory of confidence whereby 
each negotiating government accepts as an article of faith that all other parties 
2
 R i p k a , Hubert: Munich: Bcfore and After. Translated by Ida Šindelková and 
Edgar P. Young. London 1939, pp. 230—231. 
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are competent within their own constitutional setting to make a commitment3. 
Few would question the competence of a head of government and his foreign 
minister to conclude a treaty 4 . Should doubt exist as to the authority of a diplo­
matic mission, e. g., spokesmen for a government in exile, the matter must be 
clarified prior to the fulfillment of the conditions of the treaty under considerat-
ion. Contemporary governments of emergent nations sometimes advance the 
argument that treaties delimiting their borders were concluded by colonial re-
gimes incompetent to represent the interests of the peoples concerned. The 
question of historical justice notwithstanding, under international law a frontier 
agreement concluded and implemented within the spirit of the theory of con-
fidence is valid and remains so until replaced by another agreement. 
The second plea for the invalidation of the Munich Agreement — that it was 
brought about under pressure — illustrates the difficulty of arriving at a gene-
rally acceptable legal interpretation of a complex diplomatic event. International 
jurisprudence recognizes duress as a ground for the invalidation ab initio of a 
treaty whenever the representatives of a government have been placed under 
physical or psychic pressure to submit to a given set of terms 5. For example, the 
assent of Emil Hácha, who became President of the ČSR after Benes's resignat-
ion on October 5, 1938, to the dissolution of the Republic and the creation of 
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was extracted under such conditions 
of physical and emotional strain that it could not be regarded as legally binding. 
Although he was avowedly presenting a čase on behalf of the Czechoslovak 
Provisional Government, which was organized by Beneš in London on July 4, 
1940, Táborský realistically and fairly concludes that „ . . . the majority of in­
ternational authorities would probably not regard the pressure which was exert-
ed upon Czechoslovakia at Munich as sufficient to render that country's accep-
tance of it as invalid." 6 Notably, currently published opinions in the ČSSR do 
not support this conclusion. On September 29, 1972, Bohuš Chňoupek, the 
Foreign Minister of the ČSSR, addressed the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on the subject of the „Munich Diktat" and described it as an illegal 
agreement concluded under a threat of aggression which ultimately led to 
World War I L 7 Vaclav Kral, a leading historian, has cited the judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg with reference to the charge of 
conspiracy to commit aggression as a reason for nullifying the Agreement.8 As 
3
 B e r b e r , Friedrich: Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts. München 1960, vol. I, pp. 435—436. 
4
 G u g g e n h e i m , Paul: Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts. Basel 1948, pp. 61—62; K i m ­
m i n i c h , Otto: Munich and International Law. Sudeten Bulletin (Juli-August 1963) 
238—240. 
5
 P a r r y , Clive: The Law of Treaties. In: S o r e n s o n , Max (editor): Manual of 
Public International Law. New York 1968, p. 202. 
6
 T á b o r s k ý 32. 
7
 Rüde pravo, September 30 (1972). 
8
 K r a l , Václav: Münchener Abkommen — Gegenwart und Vergangenheit. In: K i m ­
m i n i c h , Otto (editor): Das Münchener Abkommen in der tschechoslowakischen 
wissenschaftlichen Literatur seit dem zweiten Weltkrieg. München 1968, pp. 89—90 
(Publications of the Sudeten German Archives No. 3). 
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evidence of illegal pressure the international lawyer Václav Michal has referred 
not only to the threat of German invasion, but also to Intervention on the part 
of the British and French ambassadors in Prague, who demanded at the height 
of the crisis that the Czechoslovak government either accept the proposal of unit-
ing the Sudetenland with Germany or stand alone in the event of an attack.9 
Jaroslav Zourek has written a detailed treatise in which he argued that the 
Munich Agreement merely served as a superficially legal Camouflage for a war 
of aggression and therefore nevěr possessed any valid international Standing.10 
Vladimír Kopal, Josef Mrázek, Alexander Ort, Antonín Šnejdárek, and Vladimír 
Soják have argued in support of their compatriots' interpretation of the juridi­
cal concept of „duress" as a cause for denying all legality to the settlement at 
Munich. 
The historical background of the September crisis remains an object of scholarly 
disputation. In any international crisis all participants share the responsibility, 
albeit to varying degrees, for conflict. On May 20, 1938 the Czechoslovak army 
carried out a partial mobilization purportedly to counteract a concentration of 
German forces on the Republic's borders. The British ambassador in Berlin 
reported, however, that there was no unusual German military activity in the 
direction of Czechoslovakia, and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain disasso-
ciated himself from the bellicose implicasions of the Czechoslovak action.1 1 
Despite this attitude of restraint the German Chancellor instructed his 
military high command on May 30 to prepare a pian for the use of force against 
the ČSR, and the proposed invasion received the code designation of „Operation 
Green". 1 2 The Anglo-French démarche in Prague of September 19 committed 
the Western Powers to a Solution by cession. There exists reason to believe that 
this Joint declaration was welcomed by Beneš, who received it as a way of 
resolving an internal as well as external political deadlock.13 At this juncture both 
Hungary and Poland pressed territorial claims in support of their ethnic mino-
rities in the ČSR so that all of the Republic's neighbors were joined in a demand 
for a revision of its frontiers. 
Unquestionably the political leadership in Prague felt itself threatened despite 
the Little Entente (1920), a collective defense pact supported by France, and an 
alliance with the Soviet Union (1935). Behind these treaties, which supplemented 
the collective security systém of the League of Nations, stood a fully moderniz-
ed Czechoslovak army of thirty-four divisions deployed in well developed de-
9
 M i c h a l , Václav: Das Münchener Abkommen in der zeitgenössischen westdeutschen 
bourgeoisen Literatur. In : K i m m i n i c h : Das Münchener Abkommen 52—54. 
1 0
 Ž o u r e k , Jaroslav: Unrichtige Ansichten über das Münchener Abkommen 1938. In: 
K i m m i n i c h : Das Münchener Abkommen 45—46. 
1 1
 N o g u e r e s , Henri : Munich: Peace for Our Time. Translated by Patrick O'Brian. 
New York 1965, pp. 138—150. For a challenging interpretation see H o g g a n , Da­
vid L.: Der erzwungene Krieg: Die Ursachen und Urheber des 2. Weltkriegs. Tübin­
gen 1969, pp. 146—147. 
1 2
 ,Fall Grün': Angriff auf die Tschechoslowakei. In: H o f e r , Walter (editor): Der 
Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente 1933—1945. Frankfurt am Main 1957, pp. 202—204. 
1 3
 M i c h a 1 53, note 6. 
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fensive positions. Nevertheless, political pressures at home and abroad left Beneš 
little alternative but to accept the stipulations of Munich.1 4 That doubt exists as 
to the wisdom of this policy choice does not provide a legal argument for de-
claring the Munich Agreement void ab initio. Most international compacts re-
quiring a transfer of territory from one statě to another are negotiated by 
governments of unequal power and under conditions of stress, yet the new fron-
tiers are held to be legally valid. In this respect the Munich Agreement is not 
exceptional. 
The third argument Táborský propounds for the initial invalidity of the 
Munich Agreement hinges on the question of whether or not ancillary Statements 
or understandings associated with a treaty are part of the diplomatic instrument 
itself. On September 19, the governments of France and Great Britain offered 
the Czechoslovak government a pledge of security for its new frontiers in 
exchange for the peaceful cession of the Sudetenland. This guarantee was con-
firmed in the form of a written declaration made after the signing of the 
Munich Agreement.15 Beneš probably acceded to the Munich Agreement 
in the belief that the Western Powers would uphold the Republic's terri­
torial integrity. His faith proved deceptive; France and Great Britain 
limited their response to diplomatic protests on March 15, when the ČSR 
dissolved under the impact of the Slovák secessionist movement and Hitlerian 
action. If the Anglo-French commitment was intended as a part of the Agree­
ment, then the latter was voided as result of the failure of these two signatories 
to fulfill their promise. If, however, the guarantee was given apart from the 
treaty, the original settlement was implemented in a legal and final form when the 
new German-Czechoslovak border was demarcated. Authorities dispute the 
binding character, if any, of letters, communiqués, and oral Statements which 
invariably accompany the signing of international accords. Such addenda are 
typical of the art of obfuscation on which treaty negotiators often depend for 
their success. 
The destruction of Czechoslovak territorial integrity through German military 
action in occupying Bohemia and Moravia less than six months after Munich 
constitutes Táborský's fourth and most telling argument. Three days before the 
Conference convened to assign the Sudetenland to Germany, Hitler declared in 
a public address that his interest was limited to the fate of the Sudeten Germans, 
and that he was prepared to offer a guarantee of the ČSR after the Czechs had 
successfully stabilized their relations with other ethnic minorities in the Repu­
blic. 1 0 Nevertheless, following a Slovák Separatist coup ďétat in Bratislava, the 
German army entered Prague. In 1964, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic 
1 4
 B e n e š , Edvard: Memoirs: From Munich to New War and New Victory. Translated 
by Godfrey Lias. Boston 1954, p. 273. 
1 5
 For the text of the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-French guarantee see United 
States Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918—1945, 
Series D (1937—1945), Vol. II: Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1937—1938. Washington 
1949, pp. 1014—1015. 
1 6
 Wir wollen gar keine Tschechen! In: H o f er 207—208. 
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of Germany, Ludwig Erhard, cited this act of force as a ground for abrogating 
ex nunc the Munich Agreement.17 Wartime declarations by the other signatories 
corroborate this interpretation.18 
The political circumstance of Hitlerian aggression did tear the Munich Agree-
ment to shreds; but the initial negotiated settlement, however cynical the Great 
Power diplomacy, was consistent with the law of treaties.19 On June 5, 1945 the 
four wartime Allies issued a joint communiqué announcing their assumption of 
all governmental authority in Germany and leaving the question of that state's 
frontiers open for further discussion.20 In the Potsdam Agreement (August 2, 
1945) the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union 
identified the German frontiers as those of 1937 with the exception of Königs-
berg, which was formally annexed by the Soviet Union.21 To the extent that the 
Potsdam Agreement approximates a peace treaty for Germany, it also represents 
the point in time when the Sudetenland reverted to the Czechoslovak Republic. 
This point of view receives support in discrete judicial decisions. For example, the 
United States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in its decisions of 1948—9 de-
clined to consider the Sudetenland as occupied territory during World War II 
and by implication treated the area as a part of Germany prior to the end of 
hostilities.22 The French Court of Appeals in Paris recognized the initial validity 
of the Munich Agreement and the transfer of the Sudetenland.23 The tightly 
reasoned French approach to the validity question is representative of legal 
scholarship without political bias. Yet the question is so freighted with emotion 
that pragmatism in the nature of political bargaining rather than the absolutism 
of the law may provide the only realistic answer. 
The Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans 
As early as 1942, Beneš wrote that the postwar political order in Central 
Europe would require the forced transfer of populations on a scale never before 
17
 G ö r g e y , Laszlo: Bonn's Eastern < Policy: 1964—1971. Institute of International 
Studies, University of South Carolina. Hamden 1972, pp. 29—31; V á l i , Ferenc: The 
Quest for a United Germany. Baltimore 1967, p. 240. 
18
 P e r g i e r , Charles: The Munich Repudiation. American Journal of International 
Law (April 1943) 308—310; U s c h a k o v , Alexander: Das Münchener Abkommen 
in den Beziehungen zwischen Polen und der Tschechoslowakei. EA 25 (1968) 517. 
19
 W r i g h t , Quincy: The Munich Settlement and International Law. American Jour-
nal of International Law (January 1939) 17—31. 
20
 For the text of the Four-Power declaration see G e i g e r , Rudolf (editor): Inter-
nationale Verträge und Organisationen. München 1971, pp. 289—290. 
21
 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Con-
ference of Berlin, 1945. Washington 1960, passim; H a c k e r , Jens: Das Potsdamer 
Abkommen. Internationales Recht und Diplomatie. Köln 1970, vol. I, pp. 23—37. 
22
 M ü n c h , Fritz: The Pseudo-Statal Regime. Central Europe Journal (December 1968) 
370. 
23
 France, Court of Claims, Paris; Hollart v. Moravia. In: L a u t e r p a c h t , H. (editor): 
Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases: Year 1949. London 
1955, pp. 14—15. 
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experienced in that region.2 4 He and other members of the Czechoslovak Pro-
visional Government determined that as soon as practicable after the cessation of 
hostilities all persons regarded by the German government as its Citizens would 
be deported from the newly reconstituted Czechoslovak statě.2 5 In the view of 
the Czech émigrés a failure to carry out the expulsion, which also included the 
Hungarian communities on the southern slopes of the Carpathians as well as the 
German townships of Slovakia and Silesia, would perpetuate the minority pro-
blems which had so endangered the ČSR in the interwar years. Undeniably the 
Sudeten Germans and their conationals in other parts of the Republic had nevěr 
been offered the opportunity of a plebiscite or any other systematic means of 
expressing their views.26 Nevertheless, it was this population, twenty-four per 
cent of the total, which had to bear collectively the brunt of the frustration and 
bitterness arising out six years of foreign governaňce. In the 'sixties prominent 
Czech intellectuals, both at home and abroad, castigated the expulsion as having 
been contrary to humanitarian and, depending upon the writer's politics, Marxist 
principles. The rabid nationalism of 1945—6 did not allow for such tolerance. 
At Potsdam the Allies condoned the expulsion, which was already underway; it 
was completed under conditions occasioning an estimated loss of life among the 
Germans of Czechoslovakia of 241,000.27 
Closely related to the problém of the Munich Agreement is the question of 
whether or not the deportation of ethnic Germans and Hungarians from Czecho­
slovakia could be sanctioned within the precepts of international law. If not, the 
present Czechoslovak regime not only confronts the charge of historical respons-
ibility for a manifold violation of human rights, but also faces the threat of 
claims for reparations as compensation for damages suffered by the deportees. 
The legal answer to the problém of culpability appears most readily ascertainable 
in the law of war, jus in hello. The humanistic tradition requiring the protection 
of individual human rights by placing limits on the use of the power of the 
statě has always been a motivating force in the repeated efforts to mitigate the 
impact of war on civilian populations.2 8 Historically the law of war has served 
to define the rights of the individual when confronted with the ultima ratio reg-
num arid therefore provides the most applicable legal Standards for rendering a 
judgment on the mass deportations which occurred in Europe during and at the 
end of World War IL A survey of the writings of jurists, provisions of treaties, 
and judicial decisions is essential to the crystallization of the core issue: what are 
2 4
 B e n e š , Edvard: The Organization of Postwar Europe. Foreign Affairs (January 
1942) 238. 
2 5
 K r a l , Václav (editor): Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, 1933—1947): Do­
kumentensammlung. Prag 1964, pp. 548—550. 
2 8
 K e i t h , A. Berriedale: The Sanctity of Treaties. In: B e n e š , D r u c k e r , T á ­
b o r s k ý : Czechoslovak Yearbook of International Law 127. 
2 7
 B o h m a n n , Alfred: Das Sudetendeutschtum in Zahlen. München 1959, p. 252. For 
a critical comment on this statistic see L u z a , Radomír: The Transfer of the Su­
deten Germans. New York 1964. 
2 8
 K i m m i n i c h , Otto: Humanitäres Völkerrecht — humanitäre Aktion. München 
1972, pp. 13—17. 
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the limits imposed on the doctrine of military necessity by the Obligation of 
belligerents to respect the rights of noncombatants? 
The Greek chronicler Thucydides provided eloquent testimony to the savagery 
of ancient warfare in which no distinction existed between combatants and non­
combatants. There was no law of war which shielded a conquered people in 
antiquity from the wrath of the conqueror.M The modem development of a 
European statě systém and its obverse of an international balance of power 
introduced the concept of a limited war designed to achieve a specific foreign 
policy objective. Military force became the dynamic factor underlying the ho-
meostatic process of action and reaction which regulated and preserved the inter­
national systém. The maintenance of every major actor contributing to a stable 
equilibrium was a cardinal principle of European diplomacy until 1914. Of 
necessity the goals of war were restricted in that action on the battlefield was 
calculated to deter an aggressor and not to redraw the map of Europe. As a 
corollary of this theory of deterrence a body of international law came into 
being to circumscribe the scope of war. 
The Spanish theologian Francisco de Victoria (1483—1546) wrote on the law 
of war against the background of the expeditions of the conquistadores in the 
New World and concluded that noncombatants are outside the scope of legitim-
ate military action.3 0 Specifically, he forbade the killing of innocents, especially 
children. Although the children of Saracens might grow up to wage war against 
Christendom, they should still be spared when taken captive. Only as an una-
voidable concomitant of a battlefield maneuver, such as bombarding a fortress, 
would no guilt attach to the slaying of the innocent. In this dictum the concept 
of military necessity, which was later applied to the war crimes trials of 1945— 
50, appears in its incipient form. 
The Dutch legal philosopher Hugo Grotius (1583—1645) affirmed Victoria's 
principles in his monumental work on the law of war and peace by expostulating 
that the sovereign could justifiably take the lives of enemy nationals, including 
women and children, only if success in battle demanded it. Those subjects of an 
enemy prince who had surrendered unconditionally had a right to their lives and 
well-being.31 Samuel von Pufendorf (1632—1694) went further than Grotius and 
asserted that natural law set definite restrictions on the extent to which damage 
can be done to an enemy in time of war, and he made military Commanders 
responsible for the acts of their soldiery campaigning against an enemy.3 2 Con-
sistent with this approach the Swiss Jurist Emmerich de Vattel (1714—1767) 
admonished sovereigns that the rights of a conqueror are limited to justifiable 
W h e a t o n , Henry: History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America. New 
York 1845, p. 2. 
V i c t o r i a , Francisco de: De indis et de iure belli relectiones. Edited by Ernest 
N y s. Washington 1917, pp. 179—180. 
G r o t i u s , Hugo: De jure belli ac pacis libri tres. Translated by Francis W. Kelsey. 
Oxford 1925, pp. 733—743. 
P u f e n d o r f , Samuel: De jure naturae et gentium libri octo. Translated by C. H. 
and W. A. Oldfather. Oxford 1934, pp. 1310—1311. 
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self-defense vis-á-vis subdued enemy subjects, and accordingly he counseled an 
humanitarian approach to the governance of occupied territory.33 
Among modern legal scholars, Christian Wolff (1679—1754) is quite possibly 
the most significant in a discussion of the concept of universal human rights as a 
means of attenuating the misery of war. Wolff agreed with Grotius that in armed 
conflict force could justifiably be used against all the subjects of the enemy 
sovereign, yet he quickly qualified this assertion by writing that the lives of 
those who had offered no resistance should not be threatened. In particular, a 
declaration of unconditional surrender terminates the State of war and with it 
the belligerent's right to take the life of an enemy. Wolff concluded his discourse 
with the proscription of the death penalty for captured enemy subjects as a 
reprisal for a military or diplomatic defeat suffered at the hands of their ruler.34 
This maxim is the antecedent of the modern prohibition in the law of war 
against the imposition of collective penalties, with the possible exception of a 
monetary fine, on the civilian population of an area under belligerent military 
occupation. ** 
During the American Civil War (1861—65) Francis Lieber, who emigrated 
from Germany after the Revolution of 1848, served as legal adviser to President 
Abraham Lincoln. In this capacity Lieber wrote General Orders No. 100, a 
manuál on the law of land warfare issued in 1863 for Commanders in the field. 
The express purpose of the publication of these Instructions was to protéct, if 
possible, the civilian population from the excesses of war typical of an inter-
necine civil conflict. Lieber began with the assumption that men at war do not 
cease to be ethical beings, and that they continue to remain morally responsible 
for their acts even in the heat of battle. The plea of military necessity does not 
justify an army's wrecking vengeance on the civilians who come under its control 
in enemy territory. In summation, Lieber wrote, „. . . military necessity does not 
include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily 
difficult."36 Accordingly, he continued, „Private Citizens are no longer mur-
dered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts."37 The prohibition of mass 
civilian internment and deportation was basic to Lincoln's policy of reconciliation 
with the South, and Lieber's code became a milestone in the evolution of legal 
norms designed to provide a minimal amount of security for noncombatants in 
a war Zone. 
The theory of limited war embodied in General Orders No. 100 received 
international recognition in the St. Petersburg Declaration (1868), which was 
adhered to by seventeen European governments. In order to provide a basis for 
outlawing the use of certain types of ammunition in battle, the signatories de-
33
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clared inter alia, „. . . that the only legitimate object which States should endea-
vour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy." 38 
Six years later in Brüssels fifteen European governments, but not the United 
States, negotiated a Convention on the law of war which affirmed and expanded 
the St. Petersburg concept of the limitations on the use of armed force as an 
instrument for foreign policy. The Brüssels Protocol (1874) stated: 
It has been unanimously recognised that the progress of civilization should 
have the effect of alleviating, as much as possible, the calamities of war, and 
that the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the enemy without inflicting upon him useless suffer-
ings.39 
As a precursor of subsequent Conventions on the law of war the Brüssels Con-
ference circumscribed the prerogatives of an occupying power in an enemy 
country by requiring that family rights, individual religious practices, and priv-
ate property be respected. 
In 1899, the representatives of the major European and American states assem-
bled in the Hague to formulate a generál agreement codifying the international 
norms of the law of war. The conferees determined that war is a condition of 
conflict among states and should be limited to armed combatants.40 At the 
second Conference in the Dutch capital (1907) this principle became the basis 
of the Hague Regulations, a legal code governing warfare and specifying pro-
visions for the protection of civilians in a combat zone.41 Although the Hague 
Regulations did not expressly forbid the mass deportation of civilians, the 
articles protecting family rights (46), outlawing generál penalties (50), and re-
quiring payment for requisitions (52) clearly preclude such reprisals as the forced 
transfer of a population from its homeland.42 The underlying assumption of 
these efforts to restrict the prerogatives of military government was that the 
individual civilian could be regarded as an enemy when he was openly bearing 
arms, and that otherwise his rights as a private person were to be protected. 
During World War I, both the Central Powers and the Entente violated the 
Hague Regulations by deporting enemy civilians from their homelands as these 
came under military occupation. French authorities deported German Citizens 
from Alsace-Lorraine; and the Tsarist government organized mass expulsions 
from East Prussia, East Galicia, and Bukowina. In 1916, the American Secretary 
of State, Robert Lansing, lodged a formal protest with the Imperial German 
Government over the often compulsory recruitment of Belgian workers for 
38
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employment in Germany.43 Although all governments sought to justify the 
deportations of noncombatants by pleading military necessity, the consensus of 
opinion among international lawyers after the war was that these forced remov-
als contravened the spirit and intent of the Hague Regulations. As long as a civil-
ian obeyed the lawful ordinances of an occupying power for the maintenance of 
public order and welfare, he had every right to expect the protection of his 
family and property. The indiscriminate expulsion of civilians from their homes 
was a form of generál penalty and therefore illegal.44 
Despite transgressions, the experience of World War I reinforced the legal 
distinction between combatants and noncombatants by limiting the concept of 
military necessity to: 
All direct destruction of life and limb of armed enemies, and of other per-
sons whose destruction in incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of 
war.45 
In this sense the expression „military necessity" refers to a Situation in which 
a vital action against the enemy may entail civilian casualties. The example 
usually given is the sinking of an enemy merchantman.46 The overriding concern 
is that acts of war be held proportional to legitimate military ends.47 For example, 
although tactical and humanitarian considerations may require the temporary 
evacuation of enemy civilians from their homes, reprisals in the form of mass 
population transfers are illegal.48 
The deportations of World War II made the illegality of these acts the sub-
ject of war crimes trials, and two decisions rendered in 1948—49 illustrate the 
narrowly limited acceptability of an appeal to military necessity as a justific-
ation for violating family and property rights. The judicial reasoning in both 
cases clarifies the proscription in positive international law against the expulsion 
of ethnic groups from their homelands. In the first trial, that of General Lothar 
Rendulic before an American military court, the defendant was accused of 
having flouted the Hague Regulations by ordering the destruction of private 
property and the involuntary evacuation of the indigenous population from the 
Norwegian province of Finnmark in 1944. The defense was able to establish 
that General Rendulic anticipated a major Soviet offensive in his sector of the 
front and removed the civilian population from the presumed battle area as a 
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measure of safety. The court martial accepted this interpretation of military 
necessity and acquitted the defendant on the charge of unlawful deportation.4 9 
In the trial of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein before a British military 
court, the accusation of mass deportation to gain military advantage, rather than 
out of military necessity, was upheld; and the defendant convicted. The prose-
cution argued that the precedent of the Rendulic decision was inapplicable 
because the number of people involved was significantly greater, and because 
documentary evidence showed that the accused ordered the movement of civil­
ians in 1943—44 in order to děny recruits and laborers to the Soviet army then 
advancing into the Ukraine. 5 0 
The foregoing decisions place the notion of military necessity in perspective 
and confirm the Obligation of army Commanders to respect the rights of enemy 
communities which have come under their Jurisdiction. The explusion of the Sudeten 
Germans from their homeland in 1945—46 was undoubtedly not a matter of 
military necessity as defined in the Rendulic and von Manstein cases. At the end 
of hostilities on May 8, 1945 the Sudetenland was a part of Germany, and Czech 
authorities who assumed governmental functions in this border region were sub-
ject to the samé Hague Regulations as applied to von Manstein. The legal con-
dition of occupatio bellica persisted at least until the signing of the Potsdam 
Agreement by which the Allies delimited Germany's frontiers to be essentially 
those of 1937 and thereby restored de jure Czechoslovak sovereignty in the Su­
detenland. Although at Potsdam the Allies approved a gradual and orderly 
transfer of the Sudeten Germans to the zones of military occupation into which Ger­
many and Austria were then divided, the Western Powers nevěr disavowed the 
humanitarian principles of the Hague Regulations and sought to mitigate the 
inhuman conditions of the expulsion. Nevertheless, the losses among the expellees 
offer mute testimony to the savagery of ethnic conflict in contemporary East 
Central Europe, and the legacy of this forced migration continues to oppress 
relations between Czechs and Germans. 
Recognizing that the expulsion was completed after the restoration of Czecho­
slovak sovereignty in the Sudetenland, the historical reality is that the deport­
ation was begun while the region was still a nominal part of Germany. More-
over, the decision to uproot the Sudeten Germans was made during a time of 
declared war and is censurable, for the International Military Tribunals in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo affirmed the principle that the intent to commit acts 
contravening the law of war is a punishable delict. The Czechoslovak govern­
ment argues that the Sudeten Germans had collectively forfeited their claim to 
citizenship in the Republic and to the protection of its Constitution. Even accept-
ing this point of view, international law does not recognize denationalization 
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as a justification for disestablishment through the expulsion of an ethnic minor-
ity.51 
Cicero's maxim inter arma leges silent regrettably remains for many a greater 
truism than the ideal of limited war embodied in the Hague Regulations.52 Inte-
gral nationalism and its concomitant of a mass citizen army inspired with 
ideological fervor often undermine the efforts of jurists and professional soldiers 
to translate the laws and customs of war into viable rules of conduct. One of 
the founders of the realist school of modern diplomacy, Ludwig August von 
Rochau, summarized the dichotomy between law and behavior in 1869, when he 
wrote: 
The art of statecraft is, as its name indicates, nothing but the art of success 
in achieving specific political goals . . . All rational human activity is, according 
to its nature, aimed at success; and the rational goal of statecraft can be none 
other than the effective utilization of national resources to achieve political 
success. A middle class „do" or „don't" which ignores the principle of success, 
takes into account only consequences of good and evil, and clings to an un-
challengeable dogma may in individual cases serve the cause of personal honor; 
but it has nothing in common with the meaning of politics.53 
The emissaries traveling between Bonn and Prague may do well to remember 
the principle of success in an awareness that pragmatic bargaining must comple-
ment legal reasoning if a Czech-German rapprochement based on parity and 
mutual concessions is to be achieved. 
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